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1. Introduction		
This paper uses institutional theory and understandings of impression management to 
examine information overload in corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures in a 
sample of companies in China. Increasing awareness of environmental and social concerns by 
investors, consumers and the general public has spawned corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) disclosures (Gallo and Christensen, 2011). More recently the conversation around 
climate change and global warming have provided further cause for environmental and social 
sustainability and CSR disclosures (Yu and Rowe, 2017) to shareholders. CSR disclosures are 
also receiving increasing attention from governments, regulators, and public institutions 
(Zheng et al., 2014). Even though governments, regulators and international groups have not 
agreed upon a common definition for CSR (Freeman and Hasnaoui, 2011), corporations have 
adopted CSR reporting as a standard practice (KPMG, 2011), voluntarily communicating to 
interested stakeholders their accountability in social and environmental terms (Gray et al., 
1995). For corporations CSR reporting is one way to demonstrate their accountability extends 
beyond financial performance (Gray et al., 1987; 1993; 2001). However, many studies are 
critical of CSR reporting as a means of demonstrating corporate accountability. For example, 
Roberts (2003) argues that CSR reporting is a ‘narcissistic concern’ by corporations to appear 
responsible; an act of corporate egoism (Messner, 2009), a legitimation device (Patten, 1992; 
Cho and Patten, 2007;), a greenwashing strategy to revamp a business image (Seele and 
Gatti, 2015; Mahoney et al., 2013; Wilson, 2013), a “carefully tailored public relations 
documents” (Lock and Seele, 2016, p.187), is little more than self-laudatory public relations 
(Seele and Knebel, 2015), and is an opportunity for corporations to engage in impression 
management (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). 
 
Despite these considerable criticisms of CSR reporting, the number of companies producing 
corporate responsibility and sustainability reporting is increasing. A recent KPMG 
International survey of 4,500 corporations from 49 developed and developing countries and 
regions found that 75% of N1004 and 93% of G2505 companies report on corporate 
responsibility (KPMG, 2017). According to KPMG (2017), this increasing global trend has 
largely been influenced by regulation and by stock exchange and investor pressure. This trend 
is evident in emerging economies such as China, a leader in the Asia Pacific region, with 75 
per cent of companies registered in China publishing CSR reports (KPMG, 2015; Yu and 
Rowe, 2017). However, much of CSR reporting in China is a result of global attention 
surrounding environmental issues and ethical business dealings by companies (Noronha et 
al., 2015), and the result of increasing pressure from the government, the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
 
This paper focuses on China as an emerging economy where CSR disclosures are widely 
criticised for their lack of quality, serving merely as a means of image management (Marquis 
and Qian, 2014).  The paper provides an empirical analysis of information overload in stand-
alone CSR reports of 15 large Chinese companies from different industries for the period 
2006-2015. Patterns of change in the CSR information ratio (that is, the proportion of the 
reports devoted to CSR reporting) of these companies’ reports are related to instances of 
coercive pressure on Chinese institutions (as an external influencing factor) and impression-
management (as an internal influencing factor) by Chinese institutions.  The influence of the 
                                                                
4 The N100 refers to a worldwide sample of 4,900 companies comprising the top 100 companies by revenue in 
each of the 49 countries researched in this study. These N100 statistics provide a broad-based snapshot of CR 
reporting among both large and mid-cap firms around the world (KPMG, 2017, p. 3). 
5 The G250 refers to the world’s 250 largest companies by revenue based on the Fortune 500 ranking of 2016. 
Large global companies are typically leaders in CR reporting and their behavior often predicts trends that are 
subsequently adopted more widely (KPMG, 2017, p. 3). 
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Chinese government on institutional reporting allows the development of hypotheses about 
the effects of external and internal pressure on these companies’ CSR disclosures.  These 
hypotheses are developed through the application of institutional theory. In particular, we 
investigate whether the decision by selected corporations to publish CSR reports results in 
information overload as determined by the CSR information ratio in concert with regulatory 
pressure from the Chinese government. This paper argues that the combined influence of 
coercive pressure on institutions with the need for impression management results in Chinese 
companies producing CSR reports in order to mitigate pressures from key stakeholders, 
including the government, and to manage their own public impression, image and reputation. 
 
This paper builds on the previous literature on CSR reporting in China (e.g. Chen and Zhang, 
2009; Meng et al., 2013; Noronha et al., 2013; Guan and Noronha, 2013; Dong et al., 2014; 
Situ et al., 2015; Noronha et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2016; Yu and Rowe, 2017) by providing 
an  empirical example of information overload in CSR reports. To the best of our knowledge,  
there has been limited discussion  about information overload in CSR reports in accounting 
literature. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, we introduce the concept of 
information overload from an accounting disclosure perspective. The next section  provides 
background on CSR reporting in mainland China, followed by theoretical and methodological 
developments in understanding and measuring CSR ratio. We combine institutional coercive 
pressure (as an external) factor and impression-management (as an internal) factors to 
interpret and understand potential causes of information overload.  The last section presents 
the analysis, discussion and conclusions of the  paper. 
 
2. Information	overload	
Information overload is a concept grounded in cognitive psychology, and was first coined by 
Bertram Gross in his book “The Managing of Organizations”. Gross (1964) associated 
information overload with the limited cognitive processing capacity of decision makers. In 
particular, ‘overload’ of information results in processing limitations for decision makers 
(Butcher, 1995; Bawden et al., 1999; Speier, 1999; Strother et al., 2012) and a poorer decision 
quality for the user (Gross, 1964).  Researchers have defined information overload variably 
across many different fields of academic research, including business management, 
accounting and medicine. For example, Eppler and Mengis (2004) categorised definitions of 
information overload into classic and subjective types. Iselin (1988) categorised the 
definitions of information load according to the quantity of repeated dimensions and the 
quantity of different dimensions and then measured information load in terms of the number 
of values (i.e. numbers) provided to a decision maker.  Thus, information overload has been 
investigated from multiple perspectives across multiple fields.  
 
Many problems resulting from information overload have also been identified,  including 
analysis paralysis (Stanley and Clipsham, 1997), cognitive overload (Vollmann, 1991), 
knowledge overload (Hunt and Newman, 1997) and information fatigue syndrome (Wurman, 
2001). Paredes (2003, p. 416) uses the metaphor “blinded by the light” to illustrate the issue 
of “information overload”. However, despite variations in the perspectives of information 
overload across different fields, a common and key issue is how the performance of an 
individual varies with the amount of information he or she receives. Schroder et al., (1967) 
developed a conceptual model describing the information utilisation patterns for examining 
the effects of accounting information load on individuals’ decision making behaviour. They 
proposed that the individuals exhibited information overload when the available information 
exceeds their processing capabilities. Most researchers have generally agreed that the 
performance of an individual correlates positively with the amount of information he or she is 
exposed to up to a certain point, further increase in information provided beyond this point 
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results in the decline of the performance of the individual  (Chewning and Harrell, 1990). In 
other words, information overload refers to processing limitations resulting from an 
‘overload’ of information such that decision makers cannot assimilate information, and it 
negatively interferes with their capacity to make a decision (Butcher, 1995; Bawden et al., 
1999; Speier, 1999; Strother et al., 2012).  
 
From an accounting disclosure perspective, information overload has become one of the 
biggest concerns of investors and other stakeholders (Earnest and Young, 2012).  
 
[w]hen disclosure gets to be “too much” or strays from its core purpose, it could 
lead to what some have called “information overload”– a phenomenon in which 
ever-increasing amounts of disclosure make it difficult for an investor to wade 
through the volume of information to ferret out the information that is most 
relevant (Jo, 2013, n.p.).  
 
Drawing upon work in organisation theory, Schick et al., (1990, p.206) propose a definition 
of information overload in accounting as “when the information processing demands on an 
individual’s time to perform interactions and internal calculations exceed the supply or 
capacity of time available for such processing”. The spectre of accounting information 
overload and its impact on the quality of the decisions made has been raised in early studies 
in accounting  with the focus on whether increases in accounting ‘information load’ for both 
external and internal reporting purposes could lead to information overload and, as a result, 
reduce users effectiveness in making decisions (e.g. Ashton, 1974; Fertakis, 1969; Revsine, 
1970). Casey (1980, 1982), Iselin (1988, 1993), and Abdel-Khalik (1973) are the “authors 
with the highest impact for studies of information overload in the field of accounting” (Eppler 
and Mengis, 2004, p.292). For example, in examining the effect on loan officers' predictions 
of bankruptcy, Casey (1980) found that officers with the heaviest information load had no 
greater predictive accuracy than officers with a lesser information load. Abdel-Khalik (1973) 
showed that the perceived risk of the borrowing firm tends to be negatively influenced by the 
aggregation of financial reports only when the financial situation of that firm is marginal. 
This result supports imputing a higher utility for detailed data, but only under certain 
conditions.. These concerns are also continued in the later literature, with studies focusing on 
the impact of information overload on the overall effectiveness of financial-statement 
disclosures (e.g. Morunga and Bradbury, 2012; Paredes, 2003). However, accounting 
literature on information overload is limited and Tuttle and Burton (1999, p.685) called for 
“future studies to more rigorously examine the concept of information overload in 
accounting”. Therefore, we build on and extend the current literature by providing a 
contemporary example of information overload in CSR reports in an emerging economy 
context.    
 
 
 
3. CSR	reporting	in	Mainland	China	
In the mid-1990s, CSR reporting in China began developing at an unprecedented rate (Zheng 
et al., 2014) and is still developing (Weber, 2017). A study by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS) in 2015 found the number of CSR reports in China increased from only 32 
in 2006 to 1703 in 2015, with 600 out of 10276 (58%) of reports published by the government 
                                                                
6 After deleting unavailable and non-profit orgnizaions, 1027 is the final number of reports. That means, 
although 1703 corporations, issued a CSR report, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences analysis is based on CSR 
reports that are both available to the public and issued by for-profit organization. 
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state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, CSR reporting in China has been criticised for its 
lack of quality (China WTO Tribune, 2009; Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009; Yu et al., 2011; Zhao 
and Patten, 2016), considerable discrepancies and incomparability in reports (Zhang et al., 
2007), for “presenting an overly positive picture of the reporting firms’ CSR performance” 
(Jin et al., 2017, p.4), and serving merely as a means of image management (Marquis and 
Qian, 2014).Zeng et al., (2010) expressed concerns about information overload in CSR 
reports by the Chinese SOEs since they readily respond to government pressure. Further, Li 
(2010) addressed the problem of information overload in the financial statement notes and 
voluntary non-financial disclosures, suggesting that more disclosure does not mean better 
disclosure. 
 
In addition, a number of other researchers report that Chinese CSR reporting lack 
comparability, are incomplete, have low credibility and that the quality of information in the 
published CSR reports is at a preliminary stages (Noronha et al., 2015; Zhao and Patten, 
2016). For Marquis and Qian (2014, p.141) CSR reports in China are “a symbolic act” since 
most reports fail to embrace international reporting standards, and few include meaningful 
indicators (Guan and Yu, 2011). Patten et al., (2015) further add that CSR reports in China 
appear to be more about legitimation than meaningful disclosure of social and environmental 
performance, and present “an overly positive picture of the reporting firms’ CSR 
performance” (Jin et al., 2017, p.4). This trend of criticism is continuing with a more recent 
study by Yu and Rowe (2017) who suggest that without mandatory reporting frameworks in 
China, the quality and credibility of CSR reports will continue to be impaired. We build on 
this previous literature by providing an example of information overload in a sample of CSR 
reports published by Chinese companies 
 
4. Two‐fold	theoretical	perspective		
 
4.1	Institutional	Theory	and	Coercive	Pressure	
Consistent with previous studies on China (see Zheng et al., 2014; Noronha et al., 2015; Zhao 
and Patten, 2016; Yu and Rowe, 2017), this paper uses institutional theory to explore external 
coercive pressures on CSR reporting and impression management to explore the internal 
pressures on selected companies  and their CSR reporting practices.  It investigates the 
relationship between these types of pressure and potential information overload in CSR 
reports. Institutional theory emphasizes the influence and impacts of societal norms on the 
strategies and activities of different institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) point to mimetic, coercive and normative isomphorism as three types of 
institutional pressures that organisations (including corporations) conform to. Companies, for 
example, will conform to prevalent structures that enhance their legitimacy and the way they 
are perceived   in the ‘eyes of others’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In order to determine the 
drivers of information overload in CSR reports, this paper identifies coercive pressures that 
influence CSR reporting in China.  Coercive pressure stems from formal and informal 
influences and “it may be felt as force, as persuasion” (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983, p.150) 
and from “cultural expectations in the society” (Zheng et al., 2014, p.228). Coercive pressure 
is often exercised by powerful entities such as the state through government regulation, but 
also, by other regulatory mechanisms (e.g. financial reporting requirements) and regulatory 
agencies (Bebbington et al., 2009; Chen and Roberts, 2010; Washington and Patterson, 2011).  
 
The Chinese government plays a pivotal role in controlling the behavior of companies 
through different regulation  that requires companies to publish CSR reports (Yu and Rowe, 
2017; Situ and Tilt, 2018). China also has a strong tradition, and a belief in representative 
government and the “state is both the judge and the most powerful player in corporate China” 
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(Wang, 2014, p. 635).As noted by Sheng et al., (2011, p. 3), “the Chinese government still 
controls a significant portion of scarce resources, such as land, bank loans, subsidies and tax 
breaks,” and accordingly, being perceived by government officials or agencies as engaging in 
actions that are “desirable and proper” are important for firms’ legitimacy in the eyes of the 
state. In addition, Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange have a 
number of CSR guidelines that companies follow. The examples of coercive pressure in 
China are outlined in the following section.   
 
 
4.2	Coercive	Pressure	and	CSR	reporting	in	China	
From 2006-2015, both the Chinese government and the Shenzhen and the Shanghai Stock 
exchanges issued a number of regulatory reporting guidelines encouraging companies to 
engage in CSR reporting (Du et al., 2014; Noronha et al., 2015; Yu and Rowe, 2017; Situ and 
Tilt, 2018). The recognition of social responsibility in the Chinese Company Law in 2006 was 
one of the pivotal moments for CSR reporting in China.  
 
Corporations in their business operation must abide by the laws, regulation, social 
and business morality and good faith rules, must accept supervision by 
government and the public, and must undertake social responsibilities (Chinese 
Company Law, 2006, Article 5, Chapter 1, p.2).  
 
Following this, in 2008, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC7) issued the Guidelines to Central State-owned 
Enterprises on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities mandating companies to:  
 
Establish a social responsibility reporting system. Enterprises if possible should 
issue social responsibility reports on a regular basis and disclose the status quo, 
plans and measures of how they fulfil their social responsibilities (SASAC, 2008, 
Opinion 18, p.3).  
 
Further, the Economics Division of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (EDCAS) 
continued the CSR trend and in December 2009 issued the first Guideline of Chinese 
Corporate Social Responsibility Reports, at the time considered a benchmark for CSR 
reporting in China.  In addition, the central government also promoted CSR in the 12thFive-
Year Plan in the Ecological Civilization Construction Project (2012) in the report to the 18th  
National Congress of the Communist Party8 of China; and in the China Dream Project9. In 
2015 China experienced another milestone when National Standardization Administration 
(NSA) issued the GB/T 36001-2015 guidelines for companies on how to prepare CSR reports. 
The GB/T 36001-2015 guidelines established the reference point for principles, standards and 
procedures to be followed in the absence of CSR reporting standards. This followed with a 
second set of guidelines  known as the Guiding Opinions on Better Fulfilling Social 
Responsibilities of State-owned Enterprises, issued by SASAC in 2016, that specifically 
focused on central SOEs. 
 
In addition to government initiatives, China’s two major stock exchanges also play an 
essential role in encouraging and mandating CSR reporting (Noronha et al., 2013). In 2006 
                                                                
7 SASAC is under direct supervision of central government. SASAC is a powerful player influencing all SOEs through it authority to appoint, 
transfer and dismiss the top executives.  
8 The National Congress is the highest decision-making body of the Communist Party of China. It is held once every five years. 
9 The China Dream Project was articulated by current Chinese leader Xi Jinping in November 2012 as a vision for the nation's future. It aims to build 
a harmonious society with better education, stable jobs, higher incomes, greater social security, better medical and healthcare, improved housing 
conditions and better environmental quality. The plan emphasises the balance of economy, society and environment. 
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and 2008, both the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange jointly 
issued the Social Responsibility Guidelines for listed companies, “calling for firms to make 
CSR disclosures” (Carey et al., 2017, p. 247). This was followed by  the  Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in 2008 mandating  corporate governance index sample companies, companies 
issuing foreign capital stock and financial companies to engage in CSR reporting, and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange requiring  Shenzhen 100 Index Sample companies to disclose CSR 
information. As noted by Zhao and Pattern (2016, p25), “the top-down emphasis on SER 
[social and environmental reporting] through the government and other quasi-state 
organizations such as the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges may be more effective in 
inducing conformity across actors than would be the case in other settings”. 
	
4.3	Impression	Management	and	CSR	Disclosures			
In 1959, Erving Goffman defined impression management as the performance of self-vis-à-
vis an audience. For Goffman (1959, p.3), impression management represents “the 
presentation of self in everyday life”, suggesting that “individuals have an objective to 
achieve congruence between their image and the image that is necessary for the desired 
impression to be perceived”. Impression management also extends to corporations as they 
shape impressions others have of them (Bolino et al., 2008). When it comes to corporate 
disclosures in both regulated (annual reports) and voluntary (CSR reports) reporting, 
impression management is evident in the way “management selects the information to display 
and presents that information in a manner intended to distort readers’ perceptions of corporate 
achievement” (Godfrey et al., 2003, p. 96).  Brennan et al., (2009) argue that impression 
management predominantly occurs in CSR reports as the less regulated area of disclosure and 
thus increases ‘‘the opportunity for impression management” (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 
2007, p. 118).  
 
Previous studies in accounting demonstrate that managers use CSR disclosures 
opportunistically to manage public impressions (e.g. Cho et al., 2010), specifically as a 
strategy to alter the public's perception of the corporation’s legitimacy (Hooghiemstra, 2000). 
Some researchers argue that CSR reports have “self-serving biases” (Cho et al., 2010, p.431), 
and allow the “opportunistic behavior of managers who select a style of presentation and 
choice of content that is beneficial to them” (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007, p.126).  Other 
researchers explored impression management in terms of the relationship between the level of 
environmental performance and the disclosures (e.g. Patten, 2002; Cho and Patten, 2007), the 
volume and tone of environmental disclosures (Rodrigue et al., 2015), and corporate tactics 
used in environmental reporting (Bansal and Kistruck, 2006). Merkl-Davies and Brennan 
(2007, p. 118) argue that non-regulated disclosure increases ‘‘the opportunity for impression 
management” and since corporations perform to an audience to whom they are accountable 
and are consequently inclined to display positive bias/impression formed in their performance 
in CSR reports, serves as a vehicle to “strategically…manipulate the perceptions and 
decisions of stakeholders” (Yuthas et al., 2002, p. 142). In the Chinese context, Zhao and 
Patten (2016, p.24) argue that CSR reporting practice “is seen primarily as a tool for 
projecting a positive image of companies’ social and environmental impacts, it seems 
unlikely that firms will ever be willing to meaningfully disclose, in a transparent way, their 
real CSR performance”. They further argue that managers almost uniformly see the purpose 
of CSR disclosure as image enhancement which potentially explains the low quality of CSR 
reporting in China (Zhao and Patten, 2016). While the majority of the current literature 
includes a discussion of the use of CSR reports for impression management purposes, we use 
the length of the reports to develop a CSR information ratio and so assess information 
overload. The following section presents the method, followed by data analysis and the 
research findings. 
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5.	Research	method	
 
5.1	Sample	selection		
The sample used is 15 large Chinese companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock 
exchanges.  Each of these companies issued standalone CSR reports for ten years, from 2006 
to 2015. Given that CSR reporting in China is an emerging practice, this sample of companies 
represents those companies that have some experience with  CSR reporting. In total, 150 
reports were sourced from the Syntao website.  This website is managed by a Beijing-based 
consultancy firm that serves as a data partner in China for Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
sustainability reports, and also that promotes sustainability in the Asian region. In addition, 
the websites of all companies were used as an additional information source.  
 
Given that SOEs represent the dominant business form of publicly listed companies and are 
the majority of listed firms on both the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock exchanges (as opposed 
to privately controlled companies) (Marquis and Qian, 2014), the companies that met the 
criteria are all SOEs but one (Company I10). The sample is summarised in Table I below 
according to each company’s industry sector. 
 
Table I. Companies Grouped by Industry Sector 
 
In addition,  eight central SOEs in the sample are in major industries and under direct 
monitoring of SASAC; and of the remaining seven companies, six are local SOEs and thus 
under indirect supervision of SASAC. Further, six companies are from the mining industry 
ranging from mineral processing to petroleum, oil and gas production, and three companies 
are from the electricity sector. These industries are generally considered to be 
environmentally sensitive  and are subject to greater public pressures with respect to 
environmental concerns. Previous studies in accounting suggest that companies with more 
environmental impact disclose more environmental information than others (e.g. Patten, 
1991). In summary, the sample comprises a range of companies typical of those on the two 
major Chinese stock exchanges and includes companies who are likely to be reporting on 
CSR activities because of the nature of their businesses. 
 
5.2	Dahlsrud’s	five	dimensional	framework		
In the current literature, there is no universally accepted definition of CSR, and there is even 
less agreement regarding its measurement.  Over time, the concept has acquired different 
meanings, representing a set of obligations, responsibilities, stakeholder rights and all forms 
of philanthropic activities (Moon, 2010). Although there is extensive discussion of the 
concept of CSR (Clarkson, 1995; Swanson, 1995; Rowley and Berman, 2000; Hillman and 
Keim, 2001), it is a term with culturally embedded meanings (Sweeney, 2007) and is a value-
                                                                
10 To protect the privacy of the selected sample, we keep the companies anonymous as Company ‘A’ to 
Company ‘O’.  
Industry  Sector Company  Ownership Industry  Sector Company  Ownership 
 
 
Mining 
A Central SOEs  
Finance 
G Local SOEs 
B Local SOEs H Local SOEs 
C Central SOEs I No 
D Central SOEs  
Electricity 
 
J Local SOEs 
E Central SOEs K Central SOEs 
F Central SOEs L Central SOEs 
Manufacturing M Local SOEs IT Services O Central SOEs 
N Local SOEs 
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laden concept (Deetz, 2013) which remains ambiguous and highly contestable in both its 
definition and measurement (Gray, 2010; Patten and Zhao, 2015). Consequently, it is not 
possible to agree on a generally accepted definition of CSR, as discussed earlier in this paper. 
Given the difficulty of finding a universally accepted definition of CSR and in order to 
determine an appropriate definition i adopts Dahlsrud’s (2008) five dimensional framework 
of CSR since it draws broadly from existing research into CSR reporting and its dimensions. 
Dahlsrud (2008) analysed 37 existing definitions of CSR  and found the following five 
dimensions  were consistently components of current definitions: the environmental, the 
social, the economic, the stakeholder and the voluntariness, summarised in Table II below.  
 
Table II.  The Five Dimensions of CSR Definition 
 
Dimensions The definition is coded 
to dimension if it refers 
to 
Example phrases 
The environmental dimension The natural environment ‘a cleaner environment’ 
‘environmental stewardship’ 
‘environmental concerns in business operations’ 
The social dimension The relationship between 
business and society 
‘contribute to a better society’ 
‘integrate social concerns in their business 
operations’ 
‘consider the full scope of their impact on 
communities’ 
The economic dimension Socio-economic or 
financial aspects, 
including describing 
CSR in terms of a 
business operation 
‘contribute to economic development’ 
‘preserving the profitability’ 
‘business operations’ 
The stakeholders dimension Stakeholders or 
stakeholder groups 
‘interaction with their stakeholders’ 
‘how organizations interact with their 
employees, suppliers, customers and 
communities’ 
‘treating the stakeholders of the firm’ 
The voluntariness dimension Actions not prescribed 
by law 
based on ethical values’ 
‘beyond legal obligations’ 
‘voluntary’ 
 
Source: Dahlsrud (2008, p. 4) 
 
Given that traditional annual reports have sufficient financial disclosure  of economic 
performance  as required by accounting standards, it has been excluded in our CSR 
information  ratio. We argue that including economic performance in the CSR report does not 
provide additional information for decision making purposes, but rather poses a potential risk 
for information overload for both report preparers and users. A similar argument has been 
discussed in a number of earlier definitions of CSR. The 1960s, for example, marked an 
extensive focus on corporate responsibility beyond economic profit. One of the most 
prominent CSR researchers, Davis (1960, p.70), argued that CSR refers to “businessmen's 
decisions and actions taken for reasons at least partially beyond the firm's direct economic or 
technical interest”. Davis revised the concept further as “the substance of social responsibility 
arises from concern for the ethical consequences of one’s acts as they might affect the 
interests of others” (Davis, 1967, p.46). In addition, Mahon and McGowan (1991, p.80) argue 
that CSR includes “behavior and actions beyond merely profit making that serve to improve 
the conditions of society and individuals within that society”.   
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In the last 20 years, the economy of China shifted to an advanced industrially emerging 
economy with high-tech, low carbon emissions and development the potential for sustainable 
economic growth. In particular, the environmental protection, social/ community 
involvement, labor conditions and a customer focus are the top issues on China’s political and 
economic agendas. In accordance with the planning goals of the central government, more 
and more companies are pursuing green development by promoting a green and low-carbon 
development model and lifestyle, protecting ecological system, achieving economic, social 
and environmental development in a balanced manner. Those practices are also incorporated 
and reflected in the CSR reports of some Chinese companies. For example, an early study by 
Li and Xiang (2007), found the most frequently disclosed topics in CSR report to be around 
employees, products, charity work and the environment. More recently, in 2017 research by 
Golden Bee1 on CSR reporting in China, found that companies assign more weight to disclose 
information about customers, employees, environment, community, investors, suppliers and 
the government. This is consistent with our findings presented in the following section, and 
environment protection, social/ community, labor condition and customer dimensions are 
widely evident in CSR reports by our sample of companies.   
 
Taking into considerations the CSR practices in China, we modified Dahlsrud’s five 
dimensions into four selected topics for identification in CSR information in the sample 
companies’ reports  (see Table III below).  These four topics are:  environmental protection, 
social/community involvement, labor conditions and consumer rights. To further build the 
CSR information ratio, we identified a set of subtopics including: ten environmental 
subtopics, nine social or community subtopics, five labor subtopics and five consumer 
subtopics in all 150 reports. Further, we considered that our selected reports disclosed the 
CSR topics when the subtopics are disclosed either in qualitative or quantitative (e.g, graph, 
figures, tabular) or other forms. The information overload is then measured by the proportion 
of the volume of four main CSR topics relative to the length of each of the reports.  
 
Table III.  CSR Topics 
 
5.3	Computing	CSR	information	Ratio		
In prior studies, the amount of information, the available processing time (Iselin, 1988, 
Schick et al., 1990) and the characteristics of the information such as overall quality, level of 
novelty, ambiguity, uncertainty, intensity or complexity (Iselin, 1993; Keller and Staelin, 
1987) are seen as major measurements of overload. In order to compute the CSR information 
  CSR Topics Sub-topics 
Environmental  
protection 
(1) waste-emissions compliance. (2) protection of biodiversity and resource 
development. (3) rationality of development and consumption of natural resources. (4) 
sewage treatment. (5) energy-saving, emissions-reduction measures. (6) compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations. (7) development of environmentally friendly 
products and environmental protection. (8) low-carbon life. (9) sustainable use of 
resources. (10) climate change and environmental-protection training. 
Social/community 
involvement 
(1) anti-corruption, anti-money and anti-commercial bribery. (2) compliance with tax 
law. (3) fair and trustworthy business-operation practice. (4) support for the construction 
of public infrastructure. (5) charity and donations to the disadvantaged. (6) public safety 
and emergency management. (7) green supply chain with suppliers. (8) promotion of 
local employment and entrepreneurship. (9) promotion of the progress of the industry. 
Labor conditions (1) employment number. (2) health, safety and training of employees. (3) employee 
welfare and social security. (4) employee performance evaluation. (5) unemployment 
policy. 
Consumer rights (1) guarantee of the health and safety of consumers. (2) protection of consumers’ 
rights.(3) product promotion, service and customer service. (4) R&D. (5) promotion of 
sustainable consumption. 
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ratio we used the processing time as the measure of information load.  Processing time was 
taken to mean the length of the reports and how long it took to read them. This use of the 
length of financial reports as a proxy for information load has been recognised in prior 
accounting literature. For example, Morunga and Bradbury (2012) counted the number of 
pages or part-pages dedicated to selected topics in an analysis of the impact of international 
financial reporting standards on the annual reports of listed companies in New Zealand. 
Furthermore, in a developing country context, Ormin et al., (2016) used the length of 
financial reports to examine the impact of international financial reporting standards on 
reports in a sample of Nigerian companies. Li (2008) used the length of annual reports as a 
measure when analysing the relationship between the readability of annual reports and 
financial performance. Li’s (2008) study suggests that the lengthier an annual report is, the 
less transparent it may be, potentially hiding adverse information from the investors in the 
details it provides. Unlike financial reporting frameworks (e.g. . GAAP or IFRS) which are 
enforced through a combination of the threat of litigation, external audit and regulatory 
oversight, CSR reporting, which is largely voluntary, lacks a standard and enforceable 
accountability framework for its content (Ramanna, 2013). This is problematic as 
exemplified by Lock and Seele (2016, p.187) who argue that companies have “extensive 
leeway in choosing what to report, which has led to diverse topics being included in CSR 
reports”. Therefore, with no regulatory oversight guiding the content and format of CSR 
reports and a lack of third-party verification of information, companies are simply left “free 
to roam” (Ramanna, 2013). With companies having significant discretion in whether and how 
much to disclose, CSR reports can vary greatly in size and content. Building on the previous 
literature, we propose that the longer the CSR report, the higher the possibility of information 
overload, requiring more time, work and effort by different stakeholders to process the 
disclosures.  
 
The volume of CSR information in reports has not been given sufficient attention in 
accounting literature. Few people other than professional accountants, lawyers, and auditors 
are likely to take the time to read every detail and every number on every page in a CSR 
report. While reports are getting longer and more complex, there is no guide on the type of 
CSR information that should be included, and so reports vary considerably in both length and 
detail. Therefore, in order to measure the information overload in CSR reports, we need to 
weigh the CSR information and calculate its proportion relative to the number of pages of the 
selected report.  As our sample of companies issued a CSR report every year, we calculated 
the average page number of the reports for each year as follows: 
 
Total number of pages for the CSR reports / number of companies  
 
In order to measure the possibility of information overload in CSR reports, the CSR 
information was calculated as a proportion of the total number of pages in each report. 
Although, each company in our sample issued individual stand-alone CSR report, the reports 
greatly varied in format, length and content. Therefore, while developing CSR information 
ratio, we referred to Groves (1994) approach in his analysis of information overload in 
financial disclosures.    For each report, we first collected the total number of pages and then 
counted the total number of pages devoted to the four CSR topics. To reduce subjectivity and 
bias in identifying the topics, two assistants read each of the reports. If there was no 
consensus about the number of pages containing the four topics, assistants exchanged 
opinions and re-read reports until a final congruence on the number of pages was reached. 
This was especially evident for low-ratio reports that were also particularly lengthy. The CSR 
information ratio for each report is calculated as follows: 
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Sum of the number of pages of the four topics / page number of the report 
6.	Analysis	and	Findings	
 
6.1	Lengthy	Reports		
The results show that a large number of the  reports are lengthy, and on average, between 61 
and 80 pages. In addition, 18 reports were between 81 and 100 pages, and 18 reports were 
101 pages or more. Our analysis begins with 2006 as this marked the beginning of CSR 
reporting in China. Company K (SOE), an electric utility monopoly, issued the first CSR 
report that triggered other Chinese companies, especially SOEs to start issuing CSR reports. 
In terms of the shortest (minimum number of pages) reports, Company J (2007) and 
Company M (2010) issued the shortest CSR reports, each comprising of five pages, this is in 
stark contrast compared to the lengthiest (or the maximum number of pages) 150 page report 
issued by Company H11 in 2010, which was written in both Chinese and English. Together 
with Company N, Company H was one of only two companies in the sample to issue reports 
in both languages, which contributed to the length of the report. For example, the Chinese-
language section of the report released by Company H in 2008 was 73 pages long, and the 
English-language section was 67 pages; totaling 140 pages and making it the longest report 
for that year among all the reports.  In a previous attempt to measure the length of CSR 
reports in China, Guo et al., (2010) analysed 71 CSR reports  and found  the average length to 
be 22 pages, with 56% of the reports no longer than 10 pages.  In comparison to  Guo et al., 
(2010) our analysis indicates that the average number of pages in CSR reports in our sample 
has  significantly increased from 43 pages in 2006  to 77 pages in 2015.  
 
The significant increase in the average length of the reports reflects the number of major 
political events taking place in China throughout the reporting period.  In 2008, SASAC 
issued Guidelines to Central State-owned Enterprises on Fulfilling Corporate Social 
Responsibilities and further increased pressures on SOEs to engage with CSR reporting. 
Another milestone, in 2012, was the proposal of the Ecological Civilization Construction 
Project published in the report by the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party. In 
November of the same year, General Secretary Xi Jinping in his speech during an exhibition, 
proposed the China Dream and emphasised the importance of CSR reporting and sustainable 
development. Following these events the Environmental Protection Law of China was 
amended in 2014. Given that the majority of companies in our sample are SOEs, we question 
whether lengthy reports reflect genuine commitment to CSR or simply serve as an instrument 
by which to build a positive image (Gray et al., 1993) to maintain legitimacy, and manage a 
relationship with the Chinese government, not only as the regulator but also as a major 
shareholder. Since the government is not only a key regulator and a policymaker, but also 
holds ownership stakes in many firms, both large and small (Marquis and Qian, 2014, p.131), 
the decision to include a CSR report can be influenced by political conditions in China 
(Piotroski and Wong, 2012). SOEs are often characterised as dependent on government 
support and funding, and as a consequence operate within a politically controlled and 
favourably financed environment.  This is consistent with Unerman and Bennett (2004, 
p.692) findings.  They argue that: 
 
CSR initiatives... are not usually strongly motivated by managerial desires to discharge moral 
responsibilities....[T]hey tend to be motivated more by managerial desires to maintain or 
advance the power and wealth of capital. 
                                                                
11 The 150 pages was the length of the report when the English and Chinese versions were combined. Since its 
Chinese version and English version is combined, the computation of its CSR information ratio is not impacted 
because both the numerator and denominator are counted in two languages when the ratio is computed.  
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In addition to economic contributions, these companies are expected to serve political goals, 
including fostering indigenous innovation, supporting social stability and assisting with crisis 
responses in China (Leutert, 2016). Further, the companies in our sample play a leading role 
in the Chinese economy, operating in pillar industries including  mining, manufacturing, 
finance, electricity supply and information technology services. Therefore, SOEs in China 
may feel great pressure from the government in terms of CSR reporting. In addition, they are 
the most vulnerable group to public attack for CSR performance given their connection with 
the government.   
 
6.2	CSR	Information	Ratio	Analysis	
 
(1)	Average	CSR	Information	Ratio	and	Information	Overload	
 
Table IV below presents a summary of the calculated CSR information ratio for each 
company in the sample. The results suggest that the average CSR information ratio varies 
widely between companies but remains consistent across time for most companies. For 
example, the average CSR information ratio for most companies did not significantly change 
over the years, and is between 0.56 and 0.58. The ratio did, however, show a slight increase 
from 0.62 in 2014 to 0.65 in 2015.  
 
 
Table IV. CSR Information Ratio 2006-2015  
 
 
As a result of government and stock exchange guidelines, a large number of reports increased 
significantly in volume (i.e. length) but without any increase in the CSR information ratio. 
This confirms our assumptions that demand for reporting CSR performance will potentially 
result in information overload for both information preparers and information users. Given 
there is no positive correlation between the length of a report and the CSR information ratio, 
the analysis suggests that longer reports do not necessarily equate to more CSR information. 
Lengthy reports may not have a high CSR information ratio, and reports with high CSR 
information ratios may not be lengthy. To further confirm information overload in our 
 
Year 
 
Companies 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
 
2014 
 
2015 
 
Avg. 
Ratio 
A 0.50  0.49  0.55  0.55  0.58  0.57 0.59 0.61  0.56  0.54 0.55  
B 0.86  0.70  0.66  0.63  0.65  0.55  0.51  0.56  0.65  0.56 0.63  
C 0.56  0.46  0.48  0.46  0.56 0.68  0.62  0.70  0.63 0.72 0.59  
D 0.74  0.55  0.66  0.49  0.40  0.45  0.50 0.66 0.74  0.74 0.67  
E 0.65  0.58  0.51  0.52  0.55 0.58  0.60  0.60 0.60  0.62 0.58  
F 0.47  0.51  0.48  0.45  0.56  0.59  0.62  0.59  0.62  0.65 0.55 
G 0.64  0.78  0.68  0.69  0.71  0.57  0.62  0.68 0.69  0.70 0.70 
H 0.63 0.63  0.64  0.52  0.58  0.59  0.58  0.55  0.38  0.45 0.50  
 I 0.44  0.56  0.57  0.57  0.58  0.59  0.60  0.61  0.60  0.60 0.57  
J 0.77  0.43  0.43  0.55  0.66  0.50  0.46  0.51  0.48  0.60 0.54  
K 0.61  0.61  0.65  0.66  0.68  0.62  0.66  0.63  0.64  0.69 0.65  
L 0.62  0.58  0.66  0.49  0.50  0.44  0.52  0.48  0.58  0.60 0.52  
M 0.62  0.62  0.65  0.62  0.53  0.53  0.50  0.55  0.68  0.71 0.60  
N 0.54  0.62  0.57  0.70  0.57  0.53  0.58  0.59  0.71  0.73 0.73  
O 0.53  0.61  0.60  0.75  0.69  0.66  0.60  0.58  0.76  0.77 0.66  
Avg. Ratio 0.61 0.57  0.56 0.57  0.58 0.57 0.57  0.58 0.62 0.65 --- 
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sample, we analysed the CSR information ratio of the longest and shortest report. We also 
presented the page number of reports with the highest and the lowest ratio (Table V).  
 
  Table V. Comparison of Number of Pages and CSR Information Ratio  
 
Year 
 The ratio of 
 longest report 
 The ratio of 
 shortest report 
The page of 
 highest ratio 
The page of 
 lowest ratio 
Ratio  The longest 
report page 
Ratio The  shortest 
report page 
Page The highest 
ratio 
Page The lowest 
ratio 
2006 0.50 86 0.86 7 7 0.86 34 0.44 
2007 0.49 112 0.62 5 40 0.78 9 0.43 
2008 0.65 140 0.43 6 15 0.66 6 0.43 
2009 0.66 140 0.63 12 64 0.75 62 0.42 
2010 0.37 150 0.66 5 62 0.69 100 0.37 
2011 0.62 108 0.50 11 63 0.66 57 0.44 
2012 0.66 128 0.46 9 84 0.66 9 0.46 
2013 0.63 117 0.51 10 96 0.63 56 0.48 
2014 0.69 131 0.48 12 66 0.77 53 0.38 
2015 0.56 117 0.46 10 54 0.77 37 0.45 
 
As Table V indicates, there is no obvious positive association between the length of the 
reports (i.e. the number of pages) and their CSR information ratio. For example, we can see 
that the report with the highest CSR information ratio (0.86) was only seven pages in length, 
and the report with the lowest ratio (0.37) was 150  pages. Similarly, the CSR information 
ratio of the report (131 pages) was 0.69, close to that of the shortest reports (there were two 
reports with 5 pages) with ratios of 0.62 and 0.66. This lack of association between a report’s 
length and its CSR information ratio is found across the table for all years and all companies.  
 
We further propose that long reports do not necessarily provide the desired CSR information 
nor better-quality information.  Rather, lengthy reports meet legal requirements for the 
companies, but are potentially less useful to investors in their decision-making process. Our 
findings are similar to that of Guo et al., (2008), who hold that a useful CSR report does not 
depend on the amount but rather on the quality of information disclosed. 
 
As the length of the report reaches its limits, the quality will not increase as the length 
increases. On the contrary, it may impair the clarity and readability of the report if too 
much unnecessary information is included (Guo et al., 2008, p.9). 
 
We considered CSR reports to be of higher quality if they have a relatively higher CSR 
information ratio, in the same way, CSR reports with a lower ratio can be considered to 
provide less CSR information resulting in information overload for information users. 
  
(2)	Patterns	of	Change	in	Ratio	
We found two significant patterns in the changes of CSR information ratios identified in this 
research. The first pattern is that the ratios for some reports remained steady, with little 
change over the reporting period employed in this research. For example, the CSR 
information ratio changed by less than 0.05 for companies such as Company A, Company K 
and Company I over the ten years under investigation. The second pattern is the inconsistent 
fluctuation in most ratios over the years of reporting considered in this research. In particular, 
we identify three periods in which this fluctuation is most evident.  In the first period from 
2006 - 2007, nine reports indicate a significant change in the CSR information ratio, more 
than 0.05.  Company G’s CSR report ratio soared from 0.64 in 2006 to 0.78 in 2007, followed 
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by a drop to 0.68 in 2008. Similarly, Company J’s ratio of 0.77 in 2006 subsequently dropped 
to 0.43 in 2007 and Company B’s ratio also dropped from 0.86 in 2006 to 0.70 in 2007. The 
2006-2007 period marked significant fluctuations in the CSR information ratio for the 
majority of the sample. This trend of CSR information ratio fluctuations continued also in the 
second period from 2008-2010. In this period, six reports had a ratio change of more than or 
equal to 0.05 from 2008 to 2009 and eight reports had a similar ratiochange from 2009 to 
2010. In the third period, from 2013 to 2014, eight reports had a ratio change of over 0.05.    
 
The fluctuations in the ratio are attributable to the number of pages in the reports, either 
significantly increasing or decreasing while the proportion of CSR information showed slight 
or no changes at all. In addition, the proportion of the CSR information either increased or 
decreased while the length of the reports showed minor changes.  For example, in 2006-2007 
Company G report increased from 33 to 40 pages. However, the aggregated volume of CSR 
information increased from 21 pages to 31 pages indicating that the change in the proportion 
of CSR information is greater than the change in number of pages.   The patterns of change in 
the reporting periods coincide with government interventions and institutional changes in 
China. For example, the Company Law Act No.5 in China was enacted in 2006, and many 
companies subsequently responded with changes in both the content and the length of CSR 
reports. In our sample this is especially evident in the variations within the first time period, 
2006-200. In the second time period, from 2008-2010, the issuance of Guidelines to Central 
State-owned Enterprises on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities directly from the 
Central Government by SASAC (2008) as well as the announcement of Guideline of Chinese 
Corporate Social Responsibility Reports by EDCAS in 2009 contributed to continued 
pressure on SOEs to produce lengthier reports. In addition, at the beginning of 2008, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange mandated that Corporate Governance Index Sample companies, 
companies issuing foreign capital stock and financial companies engage in CSR reporting. In 
the same year, Shenzhen Stock Exchange followed this by requiring companies listed on the 
Shenzhen 100 Index Sample to disclose CSR information. In the third time period, from 
2013-2014, the Central Government initiated the Ecological Civilization Construction 
Project in the 12th Five-Year Plan in the Report to the 18th National Congress of the 
Communist Party12 of China and the China Dream Project was proposed by President Xi 
Jinping. As a result, a large number of companies responded  and engaged in a serious effort 
to integrate CSR reports as part of their public disclosures.  
 
In addition to responding to coercive pressure, companies can also use lengthy reports to 
influence outsiders' impressions of their CSR performances (Jin et al., 2015). Many critics 
see CSR reports as little more than public relations tools designed to ‘‘win (or maintain) the 
approval of those stakeholders whose continued support is crucial for the survival and 
profitability of the business” (Unerman et al., 2007, p. 3).  In particular, it is an opportunity 
for SOEs to “secure the self in other’s eyes” (Roberts, 2009, p. 965), especially in the eyes of 
government as their main shareholder. Therefore, issuing dense and long CSR reports is one 
way for companies to respond to these pressures, to show a good image and maintain 
legitimacy (Hooghiemstra, 2000; Patten et al., 2015). As Neu et al., (1998, p. 265) argue, one 
of the reasons companies try to maintain legitimacy is “to ensure the continued inflow of 
capital, labour and customers necessary for viability”. This appears to be the case for the 
majority of companies in our sample since they are dependent on the Chinese government as 
a major shareholder.   
 
                                                                
12 The National Congress is the highest decision-making body of the Communist Party of China. It is held once 
every five years. 
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7.	Concluding	Discussion		
This exploratory study analysed information overload in a sample of 15 Chinese companies 
from the mining, manufacturing, finance, electricity supply and information technology 
services industries. Our results suggest that selected companies reacted to the promulgation 
of new  CSR reforms by the Chinese government, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange as evident in the increase of the length of the reports. Since all but 
one company in our sample are SOEs and controlled by the government, they conform to 
these pressures more readily than the rest of the market.  This is consistent with previous 
literature that points to the Chinese government as the driving force behind CSR reporting 
(e.g. Zhao and Patten, 2016 and Yu and Rowe, 2017). In addition, given that most of the 
current accounting literature focusses on impression management tactics in CSR reports (e.g. 
Hooghiemstra, 2000; Guthrie and Farneti, 2008) theoretically we add to this literature by 
identifying CSR report itself as impression management in China. 
 
Further, this paper has potential implications for the development of CSR reporting practices 
in China. The Chinese government calls for more environmental and social disclosures but 
gives no consideration to how information overload could potentially impair the decision-
making capacity of users. To prevent this impairment, companies should learn to identify 
material CSR topics and avoid information overload. Future research can identify the 
information overload in international firms based on GRI indicators or investigate a more 
comprehensive CSR topic list. Whether increasing the number of pages and volume of 
reports actually benefits or harms some stakeholders (users) is uncertain, and this uncertainty 
presents an opportunity for future research. We suggest that future research includes an 
analysis of information overload on decision makers and the quality of their decisions. 
  
Finally, the paper is not without limitations. First, the majority of the sample companies in 
this study are large listed SOEs which are heavily regulated and influenced by the 
government, and this may pose inherent limitations to our findings. Due to the small sample 
size, we had no opportunity to test the impacts of coercive pressure and whether it resulted in 
CSR reports by both SOEs and Non-SOEs. However, this provides an opportunity for a 
future comparative study between SOEs and Non-SOEs and companies that are 
listed/privately owned.  Lastly, another limitation is in our application of Dahlsrud’s (2008) 
framework which is of an exploratory nature and has not been applied in this way in previous 
research.  
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